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BOOK REVIEWS
PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMIAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS. By Paul Brest.' Boston: Little Brown and Company.

1975. Pp. x, 1377.
Reviewed by Jon Van Dyke2
Paul Brest's new constitutional law casebook is one of the most important
and innovative contributions ever made in this field. Because of the book's
creative ordering of materials, it immediately demythologizes the decisionmaking process of the Supreme Court and makes understandable the
doctrines that are being formed, particularly those involving the equal
protection and due process clauses. This book will prove to be an invaluable aid to law students, practitioners, and judges alike.
Instead of proceeding substantively, examining one doctrinal problem
after another, Professor Brest begins by surveying the different approaches
that Justices of the Supreme Court have taken in interpreting the Constitution-ranging from a strict adherence to the language of the Constitution, to
an examination of the historical setting of the constitutional provisions, to the
more modem "functional" approach through which the Justices attempt to
adhere to the spirit of the Constitution rather than to the letter of its
language. By subjecting a number of different legal questions to this form of
analysis, the author is able to demonstrate how malleable the supposedly
rigid constitutional provisions are and thus to help the student realize how
political all Supreme Court decisions ultimately can be. Once this process is
made explicit, students need no longer flounder, searching for "law" as if it
were written on tablets from heaven, and instead may feel free to examine
the competing arguments and thereby arrive at an understanding of whether
the Court's solution is, in fact, the best possible resolution of a problem.
I am using these materials for the second year, having used them in looseleaf form two years ago, and I notice this year, as then, that students using
the Brest materials seem to ask more basic and more fundamental questions
1. Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
2. Professor of Law, Hastings College (University of California).
Yale University; J.D., 1967, Harvard University.
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from the outset of the course. The law that is more or less settled-the law
involving the commerce clause, for instance-is presented in an orderly and
understandable fashion consuming as few pages as possible. The space
saved is then devoted to a fuller explanation of those problems that remain
unresolved.
The book's greatest contribution is in helping to disperse the fog that has
clouded understanding of the two important clauses of the fourteenth
amendment-the equal protection and due process clauses. These subjects
are introduced about one-third of the way into the book (p. 436), and the
author uses them to explore thoroughly the process of judicial decisionmaking. He starts logically with the race cases, the first subject that the Court
described as creating a "suspect category." Extensive historical information
is provided about the writing and ratification of the fourteenth amendment
which opens discussion of whether the amendment itself provides an answer
to the question of school segregation. Other race cases are subsequently
presented in a way that promotes discourse on the concept of "suspectness."
Why are racial categories "suspect"? Are they always "suspect"? What is it
about race that makes us "suspicious" about its use as a means of classification?
This material is fascinating in and of itself, but it is also enormously
helpful when the focus turns to other suspect categories, since the method
of presentation allows a class to discuss intelligently whether other traits
should be viewed as suspiciously as race, in particular alienage, age, sex,
illegitimacy, and socio-economic status. By using law journal articles and his
own presentation of arguments, Professor Brest helps students try to resolve
both the logical problems and the policy issues involved in the articulation of
legal principles. The criteria developed to determine whether a category is
suspect seem to indicate, for example, that the Court should be more willing
than it has been to view sex as a suspect category.
Another example of how the use of materials assists student understanding
is the attention given to the concept of a "rational basis" (pp. 552-75).
The Court has stated in many contexts that most legislation will be deemed
constitutional if the legislature has a rational basis for its enactment. But
what constitutes rationality? Too frequently, judicial decisions seem to give
that phrase no content whatsoever. Selecting (as he does throughout the
book) the best paragraphs from among the most creative and carefully
written law journal articles, the author provides the student with several
examples of what a court might logically consider to be a workable definition
of that term and thus enables the student to decipher judicial opinions with
greater critical tools. Because the issues that our Constitution addresses are
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too important to be delegated completely to the Supreme Court, and because
the Justices inevitably need help in articulating doctrine in this politically
volatile and conceptually difficult field, this reliance on the writings of
scholars is particularly justified. I cannot help but feel that if the Justices
read through the material on the equal protection and due process clauses
collected in this book, they would be assisted in reaching more consistent
decisions.
After exploring the contours of the suspect category component of the
equal protection clause, Professor Brest inserts a chapter examining the
problem of state action and then presents an enormously valuable 216page chapter entitled "Fundamental Values," in which he follows the uneven
path of the ground for decisionmaking usually described as "substantive due
process" (pp. 678-894). The many manifestations of this judicial mechanism-"natural law," the ninth amendment, economic due process, the right
to privacy, and the fundamental right component of the equal protection
clause-are neatly brought together under one umbrella. They are linked
by the common thread that the Justices using the doctrine must rely at least
to some extent on their personal hierarchy of values. The question of what
role the Court should play in our system of government is raised here, as in
other parts of the book, and the power that the Court can wield in its almost
unguided discretion is bared for all to view. Later, the author asks directly
whether judicial review is justifiable (p. 956), outlines the methods by which
the Court can justify a decision (p. 1086), and provides a stratification of
the scope and stringency of the Court's scrutiny (p. 987).
This book contains other organizational features that deserve to be noted.
The procedural problems normally taught in a constitutional law course are
placed at the end of the book rather than at the beginning. My experience
suggests that it is almost impossible to maintain student interest in the
problems of standing, ripeness, mootness and abstention at the outset of the
course when the students have no knowledge of the substantive issues at
stake. Placed at the end of the course, however, their importance becomes
clearer and student discussion becomes heated and concerned. Also, Professor Brest discusses judicial review of the legislature's motive at several points
(e.g., pp. 87-101, 515-16, 1018-32), and demonstrates how inconsistent the
Court has been. He also looks at how the Court has used social science data
(e.g., pp. 113, 460-61, 894-955), and again shows that the Court has
adopted different approaches from time to time.
One major omission detracts somewhat from this otherwise almost perfectly organized volume. Problems involving the first amendment (including
the problem of "symbolic speech") are introduced at a number of places to
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illustrate methods of reaching decisions, but the substantive content of the
first amendment is not presented systematically or thoroughly. When I used
Professor Brest's materials two years ago, I prepared a supplement on the
first amendment consisting of edited versions of a number of casess and this
year I will revise the package somewhat 4 to demonstrate the Burger Court's
new "balancing" approach toward the first amendment. Although Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton5 and Stanley v. Georgia6 are included in the book's
examination of the Court's protection of "fundamental values," the use of additional cases helps to amplify the problems of regulating pornography. 7
The book does not have any discussion of interstate taxation and has
somewhat sketchy materials on the foreign affairs power. I would also have
preferred some additional material on the war power and the problem of
executive agreements. Otherwise, the book is excellent, continually refreshing, and challenging. The organization, editing and commentaries all aid
in presenting a composite picture of how major decisions were made and how
these precedents should be applied to current problems. Although the book
is original and is a reflection of the creative thinking of Professor Brest, one
senses in addition something of the judicial integrity that is associated with
Bailey Aldrich and John M. Harlan, the two jurists in whose chambers the
author clerked. Both of these judges' opinions reflect a complete understanding and deep concern for the implications of any doctrine they might employ
in reaching a decision. This new casebook applies those high critical standards to the major constitutional decisions that guide our nation and reveals
3. The supplement included: Pittsburgh 'Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); New York

Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana (II), 379
U.S. 559 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana (I), 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Teamsters Local 695 v.
Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Dennis v. 'United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Near v.

Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
4. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), will replace Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973). The following cases
will be added: Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 413

U.S. 817 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
5. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
6. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
7. I plan to distribute Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975),
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), and Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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that many of the decisions cannot withstand such careful scrutiny. Professor
Brest then points us toward other grounds for decision or other possible results
and assists us in moving toward a more logical and humane set of constitutional interpretations.
I would like to note in conclusion that although I have given high praise to
Brest's new casebook (and although I expect to continue using this casebook
for the next several years), I do not mean to imply that the other casebooks
in the field are inadequate. In fact, we are fortunate in having a number
of intelligently assembled casebooks in the constitutional law field and two
of those have beeen improved through new editions that have been published
this fall. I have used the eighth edition of Gunther and Dowling for a number of years, and Gerald Gunther's revision of this casebook is a substantial
improvement of an already fine teaching tool.8 Like Professor 'Brest, he
has placed the procedural material at the end of his volume and has
combined substantive due process with the right to privacy. The fourth
edition of Lockhart, Kamisar, and Choper 9 continues to be the most
comprehensive casebook in the field, and it is always the first book to which
I turn when searching for an answer to any specific question.

THE MORALITY OF CONSENT. By Alexander M. Bickel.' New
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 1975. Pp. vii, 156.
2
Reviewed by Albert Broderick, O.P.

The morning's Washington Post editorial proclaimed do's and don'ts for a
President looking for a Supreme Court nominee, reminding us that for the
first time in half a century no member of academia sits on the Court. It is
easy to -forget that Justice Douglas was appointed as a professor from
Connecticut, not as a lawyer from his beloved Washington state, and that
8.

9.

G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1975).
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES--COM-

MENTS-QUESTIONS (4th ed. 1975).

1. Professor Bickel, now deceased, was a Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law
School when he prepared this book.

2. Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. A.B., 1937, Princeton University; LL.B., 1941, S.J.D., 1963, Harvard University; D. Phil., 1968, Oxford University.

